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Revitalizing the international legal
protection of humanitarian aid
workers in armed conflict
Francesco Seatzu
1 The  legal  status  of  humanitarian  aid  workers  (HAW)  under  international  law  still
remains unclear and unresearched. 
2 It  remains  unclear  because  there  is  no  definition  of  humanitarian  aid  workers  (or
volunteers)  in  the  international  humanitarian  law  instruments,  namely  the  four
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols. These Conventions do refer
to volunteers, but only to military volunteers.1 
3 It remains unresearched because the status of humanitarian NGOs under international
humanitarian law has been treated in international legal writings almost exclusively in
recent  times.2 This  is  a  gap  that  needs  to  be  filled,  given  the  involvement  of
humanitarian workers in armed conflicts, which leads to their increasing exposure to
frequent  attacks  and  casualties.3 This  paper  therefore  aims  to  tackle  the  issue  by
considering humanitarian aid volunteers as individuals, distinct from the humanitarian
NGOs of which they are a part. 
4 After  some  introductory  remarks  on  humanitarian  aid  assistance  in contemporary
international law, Part I provides a brief sketch of the role of humanitarian aid workers
in  international  and  internal  armed  conflicts.  Part  II  outlines  the  legal  notion  of
humanitarian  aid  workers,  with  special emphasis  on  this  notion’s  relationship  and
partial  overlapping  with  the  contiguous  notion  of  medical  personnel.  Part  III  then
explains  the  differences  between  humanitarian  aid  workers  and  international  civil
servants  (in  particular  UN  civil  servants)  as  well  as  the  differences,  respectively,
between humanitarian aid workers and international experts on mission and agents.
Part  IV  provides  a  number  of  thought  experiments  in  support  of  the  claim  that
international  agreements  between  humanitarian  non-governmental  organizations
(NGOs)  and  states  in  which  armed  conflicts  are  taking  place  and/or  between
humanitarian NGOs and the insurrectional or national liberation movements, which are
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still rare, could be used as tools for reinforcing the rights and duties of humanitarian
aid workers in armed conflicts situations and public emergencies. 
5 The  paper  concludes  with  some  specific  recommendations  for  making  these
agreements effective instruments of protection for HAWs, namely that the Status of
Forces  Agreements  (‘SOFA’)  which  deal  in  detail  with  the  status,  privilege  and
obligations of the military and civilian employees could be suitable as a model for the
drafting of the above mentioned future agreements between humanitarian NGOs and
warring parties.4
 
I.The Rising Importance of Humanitarian Aid in
Contemporary International and Internal Armed
Conflicts
6 Our  starting  point  is  a  well  known  fact:  the  proliferation  of  malnutrition,  illness,
wounds, torture, harassment of specific groups within the population, disappearances,
extra-judicial executions and the forcible displacement of people around the planet as a
result of international and internal armed conflicts has led to a dramatic increase in
the scale of humanitarian aid that is indispensable to meet the fundamental needs of
the people directly affected by one or more of these emergencies.5 
7 This  paper  argues  that  the  importance  of  this  phenomenon can be  appreciated  by
examining  three  aspects  in  more  detail.  Firstly,  humanitarian  aid  is  essential  for
helping  the  victims of  armed conflicts  to  survive.6 Indirectly,  this  is  shown by  the
circumstance that humanitarian assistance can influence the conflict itself — especially
its length and level of violence — for worse but also for better.7 Moreover, it is also
indirectly demonstrated by the general involvement of decisional (political) actors in
humanitarian actions (the so-called 'politicization of humanitarian aid').8 
8 Secondly,  humanitarian  aid  is  already  an  integral  part  of  donors’  comprehensive
strategy to transform armed conflicts, decrease violence and set the stage for liberal
development.9 For instance, although specific aid strategy generally pursues different
objectives,  aid  can  be  primarily  intended  to  prevent  the  disastrous  consequences
mentioned above by stepping inefore the health of the victims of conflict deteriorates.10
This requires prompt action either to assist the affected population groups directly or
to prevent the collapse of health care, agricultural or other local systems, thus enabling
people to cope with the situation and preventing their health from deteriorating.11 A
figure a quickly show how important prompt action has become: global aid spending by
governments and private actors has increased 400% since 2000 to $ 25 billion USD in
2014.12 
9 However, aid should also be designed to prevent the growth of dependence on outside
assistance. For example, food distribution remains a valid option when the situation
calls for it, but it often goes hand in hand with action to help the beneficiaries regain
their  self-sufficiency  quickly.  Steps  may  be  taken  to  increase  food  production  and
develop distribution channels, while protection work can help restore access to food
and in some cases specific action is needed to assist individuals suffering from acute
malnutrition. The overall strategy is usually a combination of various measures taken
at different stages in the food-production and distribution process, although there are
several  possible  approaches  to  providing  humanitarian  aid.  These  range  from  an
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extreme and very radical strategy that stops all forms of aid, although this would have
disastrous consequences for the victims of conflict (no more food, no more medical
care, no more humanitarian presence), to a strategy that indicates that humanitarian
aid shall be supplied on condition that the humanitarian provisions are respected by
the parties.
10 That  said,  and  lastly,  it  is  also  worth  adding  that  the  progressive  integration  of
humanitarian aid into the donors’ comprehensive policy was heavily influenced by the
perceived failings of the traditional humanitarian aid strategy which focused mainly, if
not exclusively, on the emergency phase. 
 
II. The role of humanitarian aid workers in
contemporary armed conflicts
11 In the current language of international communications and relations, 'humanitarian
aid workers' with their evolving roles and tasks have been provisionally defined as the
employees and associated personnel of not-for-profit aid agencies (both national and
international)  that  provide material  and technical  assistance in humanitarian relief
contexts.13 This  includes  both  emergency  relief  and  multi-mandated  (relief  and
development) organizations: NGOs, the International Movement of the Red Cross/Red
Crescent, donor agencies and the UN agencies belonging to the Inter-Agency Standing
Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (FAO, OCHA, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UN-
Habitat,  WFP and WHO)  plus  IOM and UNRWA.  The  aid  worker  definition  includes
various  locally  contracted  staff  (e.g.,  drivers,  security  guards,  etc.),  and  does  not
include UN peacekeeping personnel, election monitors or purely political, religious, or
advocacy organizations.
12 As the above definition suggests, humanitarian aid workers normally and primarily act
as facilitators of humanitarian assistance to populations affected by armed conflict and
natural disasters. At first glance it seems that there is not much to add about the role of
these subjects, but things are different to how they appear, as is often the case. This is
for a number of interesting reasons. First, the environment in which humanitarian aid
workers  including  humanitarian  agencies  and  their  staff  operate  has  changed  in
significant  and  worrying  ways  over  the  last  past  decade.  The  majority  of  conflicts
taking  place  in  the  world  are  non-international  in  character,  with  national  and/or
multinational  forces  fighting  a  variety  of  armed  groups,  often  with  significant
asymmetry  between  the  parties.  Characteristics  of  contemporary  armed  conflicts
include  the  deliberate  targeting  of  civilians,  large  scale  population  displacement,
serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, the targeting of
international  humanitarian  personnel,  and  restrictions  on  humanitarian  access  to
civilians.14
13 All  this  evidently  has  a  direct  and immediate  consequence on the  effective  role  of
humanitarian aid workers, their needs, and how they are perceived from the outside.
Indeed HAWs are no longer considered as ‘respected and protected neutral healers’,
often  becoming  targets,  hostages  and  victims  ‘of  an  anarchy  they  cannot  control’.
Evidence of this is provided by the restrictions placed on humanitarian assistance in
some recent armed conflicts in Africa, notably in the Darfur and Somalia conflicts and,
with  more  clarity  though  only  indirectly,  in  the  ‘unprecedented  levels’  of  attacks
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suffered  by  humanitarian  aid  workers  during  the  past  decade  as  reported  by  John
Holmes, UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs.15 
14 As a result of the increasing insecurity of the environment, humanitarian aid workers
currently  operate  at  a  distance  from  beneficiaries.  This  is  remarkable  for  several
reasons.  First  and foremost,  this  distance  indirectly  threatens  the  independence  of
humanitarian aid workers since it makes aid more vulnerable to serving political or
other elite purposes.16 In other words, as a result of this distance humanitarian aid
workers are often pressured by their agencies and donors. Secondly, the shift of focus
away from beneficiaries  naturally  leads  humanitarian aid  workers  to  become more
reliant  upon  national  or  regional  staff.  Finally,  distance  has  an  impact  on  the
procedures  that  the  majority  of  international  non-governmental  organizations
(‘INGOs’) follow to recruit their personnel and to staff their programmes.17 
 
III. Minding the gap: the lack of specific consideration
of humanitarian aid workers under contemporary
humanitarian and international law
15 The  starting  point  here  is  the  fragmented  status  of  humanitarian  security  under
contemporary international humanitarian law ('IHL'). Essentially, but not exclusively,
IHL means the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977
relating to the protection of victims of armed conflicts which has given rise to a system
of legal guarantees that acknowledges special protection only to certain (but not all)
categories  of  aid workers.  There is  little  doubt  that  this  is  a  critical  feature of  the
current status of humanitarian security for (at least) the following reason: the overall
and  increasing  'vulnerability'  of  aid  workers  in  contemporary  armed  conflicts  and
public emergencies.  Incidentally,  it  is  worth observing that this 'fragmentation' has
been well described (in rather negative terms) by the International Committee of the
Red Cross ('ICRC') in a recent research pamphlet which points out the concern that “the
personnel of humanitarian organizations are protected in an unequal manner and that
the rules intended to guarantee their security are very widely scattered, thus leading to
a  lack  of  clarity  about  the  exact  scope  of  such  protection.”18 Moreover,  Professor
Andrea  Schneiker  in  his  masterpiece  monograph  has  also  detected  and  strongly
criticized the status of  'Humanitarian NGOs,  (In)Security and Identity etc',  recalling
that  "this  fragmentation  (the  fragmentation  of  humanitarian  security)  impairs  the
impact  of  security  measures,  particularly  at  the  national  level  where  the  risk  is
greatest."19 
16 One of the core principles of the humanitarian security system is that medical services
of armed forces, civilian hospitals in wartime, affiliates of the International Red Cross
and Red Crescent Movement (including national societies, the International Federation
of  Red Cross  and Red Crescent  Societies  (‘IFRC’),  and the ICRC)  are  granted special
protections  and  rights  through  the  use  of  the  distinctive  Red  Cross/Red  Crescent
emblem which is a recognized and protected symbol under IHL. The rationale behind
this legal principle is evident and deserves little argumentation as 'protections for the
wounded  would  be  largely  meaningless  without  access  to  medical  personnel  and
supplies'.20 Common Article 3 expressly requires,  in rather broad but precise terms,
that “[t]he wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.”21 It is therefore very
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useful to consider in depth two corollaries of this international humanitarian security
principle.
17 The first and most important corollary is  that military medical personnel (and also
religious personnel as indicated in Art.  37 of the Geneva Convention II)22 cannot be
treated  as  persons  directly  involved  in  hostilities.  Under  Article  37  of  the  Geneva
Convention II, if religious, medical, and hospital personnel are captured by the enemy,
they shall be respected and protected. More specifically, again according to Art. 37,
they may continue to carry out their duties as long as this is indispensable for the care
of the wounded and sick. Finally, and equally importantly, they shall afterwards be sent
back as soon as the Commander-in-Chief, under whose authority they are operating,
considers it practicable.23
18 Another corollary is  that  persons belonging to  these two categories  of  aid workers
(religious and medical/hospital personnel) cannot be considered military targets and
cannot be attacked. In positive terms, Article 24 of 1949 Geneva Convention I stipulates
that military medical personnel shall only be “exclusively engaged in the search for, or
the collection, transport or treatment of the wounded or sick, or in the prevention of
disease,  staff  exclusively  engaged  in  the  administration  of  medical  units  and
establishments,  as  well  as  chaplains  attached  to  the  armed  forces,  and  shall  be
respected  and  protected  in  all  circumstances.”  This  ad  hoc regulation  is  well
complemented by the First Additional Protocol that clarifies that Contracting States
have due diligence obligations  also  in  relation to  the  treatment  of  civilian medical
personnel.  Indeed  this  Protocol  provides  that  civilian  medical  personnel  shall  be
respected and defended and, if  indispensable,  all  available help shall  be afforded to
them in an area where civilian medical services are disrupted due to combat activity.
19 Can  the  above-mentioned  protective  (special)  regime  for  medical  and  religious
personnel be made applicable also to the other categories of aid workers in general and
to humanitarian aid workers in particular? A broad and purposive approach to the
interpretation of the pertinent provisions of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and
Additional Protocols would suggest that it could and that, if adopted, this interpretative
approach would also produce a tangible and immediate benefit for humanitarian aid
workers. It would mean that the otherwise applicable generic civilian protection would
not be applied to HAWs as it can hardly be considered appropriate to cope with the
special needs arising from the latter’s current 'vulnerability'. But this benefit should
not, however, be overestimated for three fundamental reasons: a) the generic civilian
protection shall apply in any case in combination with Art. 71 of Additional Protocol I
that includes a special protective regime for the benefit of the personnel participating
in  relief  actions;24 b)  as  clarified  by  the  International  Court  of  Justice  (‘ICJ’)  in  the
Nuclear Weapon Advisory Opinion, human rights law continues to be applicable during
armed conflict, in particular ‘…the protection of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political  Rights (ICCPR) does not cease in times of  war,  except by operation of
Article 4 of the ICCPR whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in a time of
national emergency’;25 c) it is by no means certain that the lex specialis26 applicable to
medical and religious personnel would be a good solution for tackling the problem of
protecting humanitarian aid workers in armed conflict situations.27
20 Looking now at the international legal sources other than the IHL treaties, it is worth
stressing  that  the  interpretation  of  the  1994  Convention  on  the  Safety  of  UN  and
Associated  Personnel,  currently  the  most  positive  development  in  the  area  of
Revitalizing the international legal protection of humanitarian aid workers i...
La Revue des droits de l’homme, 11 | 2017
5
protection of peacekeepers, would not be equally admissible for one fundamental and
decisive reason: humanitarian aid workers can be likened neither to international civil
servants  in  general  nor  to  UN  civil  servants  (or  UN  and  associated  personnel)  in
particular, as the latter both presuppose a working relationship (i.e. a contract that
provides them with various allowances and benefits) respectively with an international
intergovernmental  organization  (IGOs)  and  the  United  Nations.28 Indirectly,  this
conclusion is corroborated by the fact that UN Volunteers (‘UNVs’) cannot be qualified
as ‘officials’ of the Organization, with the meaning of Art. 105 of the UN Charter, which
provides that: “ …. Officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privilges and
immunities  as  are  necessary  for  the  independent  exercise  of  their  functions  in
connection  with  the  Organization’.29 Again,  and,  equally  significantly,  it  is  also
corroborated by the following two facts: firstly, the UNVs are not ‘staff’ members of the
UN Secretariat, under Articles 100 and 101 of the Charter and, secondly, the UNVs are
not subject to the UN Staff rules and regulations.30 
21 This  conclusion  cannot  be  rebutted  by  the  circumstance  that  the  2005  Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel expands the
scope of protected subjects also to include personnel focusing on: “(a) the deliverance
of  humanitarian,  political  or  development  assistance  in  peacebuilding,  or  (b)
deliverance of emergency humanitarian assistance.”31 Prima facie this would represent
a  solid  argument  in  favor  of  an  expansive  interpretation.  Nevertheless,  a  careful
examination of the 2005 Optional Protocol suggests a (different) negative conclusion to
be the most legally correct. More precisely, this is what emerges from a consideration
of  the  purpose  of  the  Optional  Protocol  to  include  a  wider  set  of  operations  and
associated personnel exclusively when they are related to the UN and its programmes.
Again,  this  is  also  what  is  indirectly  confirmed  by  the  definition  of  'associated
personnel' in the Optional Protocol that includes other personnel — such as members
of NGOs — only if assigned to act in an official capacity by UN personnel. If all this is
correct, as it seems to be, it then follows inter alia that, unlike for UN peacekeeping
personnel,  attacks  knowingly  and  intentionally  oriented  against  humanitarian  aid
workers cannot be qualified as 'war crimes'  according to the UN Security Council's
Resolution 1502 of 2003.32 But this should not also preclude the International Criminal
Court  (ICC)’s  considering,  in  conformity  with  Art.  8  (2)  of  its  Statute  ('the  Rome
Statute'), intentional attacks against humanitarian personnel (including humanitarian
aid workers) and assets as 'war crimes'.33 
22 Finally, it  is  worth examining whether humanitarian aid workers can be likened to
experts on mission,  at  least  for the purpose of  applying the UN Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of 1998.34 That this might be so is suggested by the fact that
persons,  other  than  officials  of  the  UN,  who  are  entrusted  with  tasks  requiring
professional expertise by the Secretary-General, or by an organ of the United Nations,
may  be  accorded the  status  of  experts  on  mission  under  the  Convention  on  the
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.35 It is also indicated by the fact that it
currently makes disparities between aid workers along individual and organizational
lines,  in the form of privileges for UN and associated personnel disappearing.36 But
there are also sound reasons against this interpretation of 'expert on mission' status for
HAWs.  First,  an  explicit  (or  implied)  decision  of  the  UN  General  Assembly  is
indispensable before a HAW can be an 'expert on mission'.37 Secondly, the privileges
and  immunities  enjoyed  by  international  experts  on  mission  are  enjoyed  in  the
interests of the United Nations and not for their personal benefit.38 For example,  if
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immunity is asserted against a third party alleging damage by the expert, a remedy
must be provided by the United Nations to finally dispose of the substance of the claim,
and the Secretary-General has the right and duty to waive these immunities “in any
case where, in his opinion, the immunity would impede the course of justice and can be
waived without prejudice to the interests of the United Nations.” Lastly, ‘experts on
missions  for  the  UN’  are  generally  persons  serving  in  their  capacity  on  certain
subsidiary bodies of the UN without being either staff members or representatives of
the Member States or military observers on peace-keeping missions.39 
 
IV.Filling the gap: a tentative proposal for reinforcing
the protection of humanitarian aid workers under
international humanitarian law. 
23 The above raises the question as to whether or not a solution can be envisaged to
protect  humanitarian  aid  workers  in  the  event  of  armed  conflict  and  public
emergencies in view of the overall inadequacy of the protection of the general civilian
population and of the protective special regimes for medical and religious personnel. 
24 The contentious idea here is that a good solution can be worked out. It would involve
using the agreements that  NGOs (to  which the humanitarian aid workers  generally
belong)40 may  conclude  with  sovereign  states  and  other  territorial  subjects  of
international  law,  such  as  insurrectional  and  national  liberation  movements,  to
reinforce the guarantees that international humanitarian law could provide them. 
25 But this would necessarily require the development of a radically different attitude by
international NGOs toward their relations with states in general and the states in which
armed conflicts are taking place in particular, considering that only the International
Committee of the Red Cross (IRC) has so far entered into international legal agreements
with states and state entities. But although this attitudinal change is perhaps unlikely,
it is not impossible. This is indirectly confirmed by both the numerous international
juridical  agreements concluded between NGOs and IGOs that are often governed by
international  law  and  by  the  growing  perception  that  legal  entities  including
humanitarian NGOs can be held responsible for breaches of IHL, not only for their own
acts but also, in certain cases, for the acts of their employees.41Moreover, and equally
importantly, that this attitudinal change is possible is also indirectly confirmed by the
fact  that  most  agreements  by  NGOs  with  national  governments  are  relational  in
practice, though formally hierarchical in theory.42 
26 How should such international agreements be drafted to achieve the above-indicated
protective goal? It is likely that future international agreements between humanitarian
NGOs  and  the  sovereign  states  in  which  armed  conflicts  are  taking  place  and/or
between humanitarian NGOs and other territorial subjects of international law would
have to  be  drafted by following the general  structure,  pattern and contents  of  the
Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs). 
27 SOFAs are  normally  conceived as  agreements  between two sovereign states:  a  host
country and a foreign nation stationing military forces in that country. However, SOFAs
can  also  be  framed  as  agreements  between  a  host  state  and  an  international
organization for the maintenance of peace and security like NATO or United Nations.
Along with other types of military agreements, SOFAs are frequently included as part of
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a comprehensive security arrangement. Of most interest here, SOFAs aim to clarify the
terms under which the foreign military force is allowed to operate. Typically, purely
military operational issues such as the locations of bases and access to facilities are
covered  by  separate  agreements.  A  SOFA  is  more  concerned  with  the  legal  issues
associated with military individuals and property. This may include such matters as
entry and exit into the country, tax liabilities, postal services, or employment terms for
host-country  nationals,  but  the  most  contentious  issues  are  civil  and  criminal
jurisdiction over bases and personnel. For civil matters, SOFAs provide for how civil
damages produced by the forces will be determined and paid. Criminal questions vary,
but the typical provision in U.S. SOFAs is that U.S. courts will have jurisdiction over
crimes committed either by a service member against another service member, or by a
service member as part of his or her military obligation, while the host nation retains
jurisdiction over other crimes. 
28 Understandably,  given  the  profound  and  radical  differences  between the  activities
carried out by humanitarian aid workers and armed forces, it is clear that unlike the
SOFAs  the  primary  emphasis  of  the  future  international  agreements  between
humanitarian NGOs and the states in which armed conflicts are taking place (and/or
between  the  humanitarian  NGOs  and  the  insurrectional  or  national  liberation
movements) could never be on criminal and civil jurisdiction. Instead, such agreements
would  focus  on  the  protective  guarantees  of  the  fundamental  rights  and  needs  of
humanitarian aid workers, above all the right to safety and security, the right to work
and the right to free movement in and out of the host country. 
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ABSTRACTS
Contemporary armed conflicts have seen an increase in the number of humanitarian aid workers
(HAW)  being  attacked.  This  is  so  notwithstanding  these  subjects  have  traditionally  received
international  legal  protection  under  the  four  Geneva  Conventions  of  1949  and  the  related
Protocols I  and II of 1977, and de facto immunity from attack by warring parties. This article
analyses in detail how international humanitarian law (IHL) can be used to protect this category
of currently highly vulnerable subjects to mitigate the direct and indirect consequences on them
of  (international  and  non-international)  armed  conflicts  and  of  other  public  emergencies,
together with its limits. With its historical origin and purpose of protecting persons not taking
part in hostilities (persons hors de combat), IHL focuses on the protection of civilians suffering
from  the  direct  consequences  of  armed  conflicts,  such  as  injuries  occurring  from  ongoing
hostilities. In other words, the Geneva Conventions forbid combatants to attack persons hors de
combat  and require  occupying  forces  to  keep general  order.  However,  IHL  does  not  require
warrying  parties  to  guarantee  the  safety  of  humanitarian  aid  workers  (it  does  not  require
warring parties to supply security escorts, for instance, when other factions threaten the safety
of non-combatants operating in their area) nor guarantee access of humanitarian aid workers to
affected areas:  governments or occupying forces may,  if  they wish,  ban a relief  agency from
working in their area. The paper concludes with a proposal for reinforcing and complementing
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the protection of humanitarian aid workers during armed conflict situations, namely drafting
future international agreements between humanitarian NGOs (to which the majority of HAWs
belong)  and belligerent  parties  in  a  way that  is  similar  to  the Statute  of  Forces  Agreements
(SOFAs), which deal in detail with the status, privilege and duties of the military and civilian
employees.
Les  conflits  armés  ont  considérablement  augmenté  les  attaques  contre  les  travailleurs
humanitaires  en  dépit  de  la  protection  internationale  et  de  l’immunité  ont  ils  bénéficient
traditionnellement en vertu des quatre conventions de Genève de 1949 et  de leur protocoles
additionnels de 1977. Cet article analyse en detail comment le droit international humanitaire
peut être utilisé pour améliorer la protection des personnes “hors combat” intervenant sur les
lieux de conflits. Il propose de renforcer la protection des travailleurs humanitaires durant les
situations de conflit armé en envisageant des accords internationaux entre les ONG et les parties
belligérantes de façon similaire au Statute of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) qui régit en detail les
statuts, droits et obligations des employés civils et militaires.
INDEX
Mots-clés: travailleurs humanitaires, humanitaires bénévoles, assistance humanitaire,
Conventions de Genève de 1949, accords IGOs/NGO, Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA), ONG,
droit international humanitaire
Keywords: humanitarian aid workers, humanitarian aid volunteers, humanitarian aid assistance;
1949 Geneva Conventions, IGOs/NGOs’ agreements, status of forces agreements (SOFA),
humanitarian NGOs, international humanitarian law (‘IHL’)
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